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Abstract 
This paper provides new insights on the relationship between corporate debt maturity and 
agency costs by investigating empirically the impact of managerial ownership and the 
divergence between control and cash-flow rights on debt maturity. We observe a significant 
negative effect of managerial ownership on debt maturity. Moreover, the results reveal that the 
wedge between control and cash-flow rights also exerts a negative influence. Our analysis 
further suggests that the negative effect of managerial ownership decreases in widely-held firms 
and increases with the discrepancy between control and cash-flow rights. 
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1. Introduction  
The relationship between debt maturity and agency costs of corporate financial 
decisions has been an important issue in the capital structure literature. Specific 
attention, in this context, has been paid to the role of debt maturity in reducing the so-
called underinvestment problem, described in Myers (1977), which arise from the 
agency conflicts between a firm’s shareholders and debtholders. It is widely 
acknowledged that short-term debt may be more effective than long-term debt in 
reducing the expected agency costs of the underinvestment problem. 
However, prior empirical research on debt maturity does not say much on the 
implications of the potential interactions between debt maturity and other central agency 
conflicts within the firm. For example, to our knowledge, there is no previous empirical 
work that investigates the effects of the fundamental agency problem of the separation 
of ownership and control on debt maturity structure. Similarly, the influence of 
managerial incentives on debt maturity has not been investigated. This paper therefore 
aims to provide new insights on such issues by taking a closer look at managerial 
ownership and the divergence between control and cash flow rights. By doing so, this 
paper extends the earlier analyses and enhances our understanding of the role agency 
concerns play in determining debt maturity decisions. 
To investigate these issues empirically, we use a sample of 771 UK firms. Our 
results point to a significant negative influence of managerial ownership on debt 
maturity. However, managers in widely-held firms tend to hold more long-term debt. 
We also find that firms with greater divergence between control and cash-flow rights 
seem to hold more short-term in their capital structure. Furthermore, the results reveal 
that the negative impact of managerial ownership on debt maturity increases with the 
discrepancy between control and cash-flow rights. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the possible theoretical 
interactions between managerial incentives, divergence between control and cash-flow 
rights and debt maturity. Section 3 briefly explains other control variables used in the 
empirical analysis. Section 4 explains the data, which is followed by presenting the 
results. Finally, section 6 concludes the paper. 
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2. Debt maturity and ownership characteristics 
The underinvestment problem of Myers (1977), which has received a great deal of 
attention in the corporate finance literature, is due to the outstanding debt in the firm’s 
capital structure. The agency problem arises between shareholders and debtholders 
because firms with risky debt may have incentives to pass up some of the valuable 
growth options. One of the mechanisms to address the underinvestment problem is the 
firm’s debt maturity structure. It is argued that firms with greater growth opportunities 
should have more short-term debt because shortening debt maturity would make it more 
likely that debt will mature before any opportunity to exercise the growth options.
1
 
Another central issue relating to agency conflicts concerns the role of managerial 
ownership and managerial discretion in influencing financing and investment decisions 
of firms. Prior research points out that the firm’s resources may be diverted by 
managers for their private benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; and Jensen, 1986). This 
can take alternative forms such as excessive salaries, dilution of the ownership of 
outsiders, and commitment of resources to unprofitable investment projects.  
We note that the severity of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders is 
likely to differ across firms depending on managerial shareholdings. It is argued that as 
managerial ownership increases, the ability of outside investors to monitor managers 
declines. This, in turn, may lead to a greater degree of managerial control and 
entrenchment of managers (McConnell and Servaes, 1990). Accordingly, managerial 
ownership may act as a proxy for the conflicts of interests between managers and 
outside shareholders, and the associated costs. Furthermore, shortening debt maturity 
can be effective because it can act as a disciplinary device on managers as it increases 
the risk of liquidity and premature liquidation of the firm’s assets.2 This line of 
argument leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
Prediction 1.   There is a negative relationship between managerial ownership and debt 
maturity. 
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1
 Consistent with this prediction, there are studies that find a negative relation between maturity and 
growth opportunities (see, e.g., Barclay and Smith, 1995; Guedes and Opler, 1996; and Ozkan, 2000, 
among others). 
2
 See Johnson (2003) for further discussion on the relationship between debt maturity and liquidity risk. 
3
 In addition to the expected agency benefits of shorter-term debt, in increasing short-term debt managers 
may also consider the benefits due to the reduction in the likelihood of takeover attempts. 
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However, we do not rule out the possibility that managers may also have incentives to 
have more long-term debt than optimal in some circumstances. For example, to the 
extent that managers of widely-held firms have greater discretion, one could argue that 
managers in such firms may attempt to escape the discipline provided by short-term 
debt and hence issue more long-term debt. This reduces the probability of bankruptcy 
and may enable managers to use excess cash for their benefit. This can happen even if 
short-term debt is more beneficial to an average shareholder in the presence of costly 
agency conflicts. The benefits to managers through the reduced expected agency costs 
would be limited because, by definition, their shareholdings in widely-held firms are 
relatively small. The above discussion leads to the following prediction. 
 
Prediction 2.   In widely-held firms, the negative impact of managerial ownership on 
debt maturity decreases. 
 
Furthermore, we recognise that there are other measures that can be used to proxy for 
agency costs. For example, one such measure is the discrepancy between ownership 
(cash-flow rights) and control-rights. It is argued that the agency costs in firms with 
greater discrepancy are expected to be higher (Harvey et al., 2004). This is mainly 
because cash-flow rights of shareholders are related to the positive incentive effect, 
while control-rights relate to the negative entrenchment effect on firm value (see, e.g., 
Claessens et al., 2002). Then, one would expect firms with shareholders whose cash-
flow rights are significantly less than their control-rights to choose more short-term debt 
in an attempt to curtail the negative impact of agency costs on firm value. 
 
Prediction 3.  There is a negative relationship between the divergence between 
control-rights and cash-flow rights of shareholders and debt maturity. 
 
3. Other control variables 
In what follows, we briefly explain the control variables used in the empirical 
analysis. 
Leverage. Bankruptcy concerns due to high leverage may cause long-term debt 
choice to hedge against bankruptcy risk (Morris, 1992). However, leverage and maturity 
can be negatively related as agency costs of underinvestment can be mitigated by 
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reducing leverage as well as shortening maturity (Dennis et al., 2000). We measure 
leverage as the ratio of book value of total debt to total assets. 
Liquidity. Due to their ability to meet borrowing restrictions, firms with higher 
liquidity balances will be able to lengthen their debt maturity (Morris, 1992). This 
would imply a positive relation between liquidity and maturity. We measure liquidity as 
the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
Asset Maturity. Myers (1977) argues that the underinvestment problem can be 
reduced by matching the maturity of a firm’s debt to that of its assets. This leads us to 
predict a positive relationship between debt and asset maturities. We measure asset 
maturity as the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to annual depreciation 
expenses.  
Earnings Variability. The association of debt maturity with earnings variability is 
expected to be inverse so that the firm does not have to rebalance its capital structure as 
often to moderate expected bankruptcy costs when the earnings volatility decreases. 
Variability in earnings is measured as the standard deviation of earnings before interest, 
tax and depreciation (EBITD) divided by average total assets. 
Growth opportunities. It is suggested that firms with more growth options are 
associated with more use of short-term debt in their debt maturity mix (Myers, 1977). 
The counter argument, however, is that firms with substantial growth opportunities 
might borrow long-term to avoid liquidation of their valuable projects (Diamond, 1991). 
Growth opportunities are measured by the market-to-book ratio, which is the book value 
of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book 
value of total assets. 
Size. Smaller firms with potentially severe agency problems have much more 
difficult access to the capital markets, which proposes a direct relation between firm 
size and debt maturity. Firm size is measured as logarithm of total assets in 1996 prices. 
 
4. Data Description 
We use a sample of listed UK firms for the period from 1996 to 2000. Data for the 
shareholdings of directors and company accounts were collected from Datastream. Data 
for the ultimate controllers of firms were obtained from Faccio and Lang (2002). After 
some data filtering, we were left with 771 matched firms for our analysis. 
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Table 1 provides a brief analysis of the ultimate ownership structure of the UK 
companies included in our sample. Companies are mainly classified into two groups:  
widely-held, which have no owners with significant control rights, and those with 
controlling owners. We report results for two different cut-off levels for controllers, 
namely 10 and 20 percent thresholds (for a detailed discussion see Faccio and Lang, 
2002). Also, controlling owners are further classified into six categories: widely-held 
corporations, financial institutions, family, unlisted companies, state, and miscellaneous.   
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
In Panel A of Table 1 we present percentage and number of firms controlled by 
different categories of owners at both cut-off levels. At the 10 percent level, only 24.36 
percent of firms are widely-held. Family-controlled firms comprise 26.67 percent of 
firms in our sample, which makes it the largest category. Furthermore, 20.38 percent of 
firms are controlled by financial institutions. Another important category is the unlisted 
companies that control 18.72 percent of firms.  
In Panel B we report summary statistics on the control rights of the largest 
controlling owner in each category of controller, where the ultimate control threshold is 
10 percent. The average percentage values of control rights of the largest controlling 
shareholder are 38.35 and 29.52 for firms that are controlled by widely-held 
corporations and family, respectively. The average percentage is 20.20 percent for firms 
where the largest controlling shareholder is a financial institution. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The 
average long-term debt, defined as the ratio of debt matures in more than one year to 
total debt, is about 52 percent. The table also reveals that, on average, directors own 
about 12 percent of total shareholdings in the UK companies. Finally, the mean ratio of 
control rights to cash-flow rights is nearly 1.72. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
5. Empirical Results 
In the following we provide the results of several cross-sectional debt maturity 
models using the average values of the explanatory variables (except variability and 
ownership variables) over the period 1996-1999 and we measure the dependent variable 
(debt maturity) in 2000. We do so in an attempt to mitigate problems that might arise 
due to short-term fluctuations or extreme values in one year. Using past values also 
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reduces the likelihood of observed relations reflecting the effects of debt maturity on 
firm-specific factors (see also Rajan and Zingales, 1995, for a similar methodology). 
Ownership variables are measured in 1997. Given that equity ownership structure of 
firms is relatively stable over a certain period of time, we do not expect that measuring 
ownership characteristics in a single year would yield a significant bias in our results 
(see also La Porta et al., 2002, among others). 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Under all specifications in Table 3, debt maturity decisions are proxied by the ratio 
of debt that matures in more than one year to total debt. We begin our investigation of 
the agency determinants of debt maturity decision by focusing on the impact of 
managerial shareholdings. In column (1) of Table 3, we report the regression results for 
the basic model that includes the control variables described earlier and the managerial 
ownership variable (Man_Own). The results reveal that the impact of managerial 
ownership on debt maturity is negative and significant (at 5 % level). This can be taken 
as evidence for the view that firms prefer more short-term debt when the expected 
agency costs of managerial ownership are higher.
4
 As also mentioned earlier, the 
negative effect may be due to the managerial incentives to reduce the likelihood of 
takeover attempts by making the firm riskier to outside investors.  
In column (2), we additionally test whether the debt maturity decisions of widely-
held firms are different from those of the firms with controllers. We also test if the 
negative impact of managerial ownership changes in widely-held firms. To do so, we 
incorporate two additional variables into the model, namely Widely_Held, a dummy 
variable that takes a value of one if the firm is widely-held, and an interaction variable 
Man_Own * Widely_Held to measure the conditional impact of managerial ownership 
on the firm’s debt maturity structure. This would allow us to test if the effect of 
managerial ownership varies between widely-held and controlled firms.  
The results for model (2) suggest that the main effect of managerial ownership is 
still negative but the conditional effect is positive and significant (at 10 % level). This 
                                                          
4
 We note that the relationship between managerial ownership and debt maturity can be non-monotonic, 
implying that the marginal effect of increased managerial ownership depends on the level of managerial 
ownership. This implies that at lower levels of managerial ownership the interests of managers and 
outside shareholders may be aligned. To test this possibility, we also estimated a quadratic model that 
predicts that as managerial ownership increases, we expect to observe first a positive (incentive-
alignment), then a negative (entrenchment) effect exerted by managerial ownership on debt maturity. 
However, we do not find any meaningful non-linear impact of managerial ownership and hence do not 
report the results. 
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suggests that the negative impact of managerial ownership on debt maturity decreases in 
widely-held firms. As discussed earlier, managerial discretion in widely-held firms may 
be greater and hence managers of such firms may prefer to issue more long-term debt.  
In order to provide more insight into the impact of agency costs on debt maturity 
structure we present in column (3) the results with an additional variable (Divergence) 
that measures the wedge between control and cash-flow rights. The estimated 
coefficient of this variable is negative and significant (at 1 % level), possibly providing 
further evidence for the notion that, other things being equal, firms with greater 
expected agency costs prefer short-term debt to mitigate the negative effects of these 
costs on firm value. This also points to the effective role of debt maturity as an internal 
corporate governance mechanism. 
Finally, we examine in column (4) whether the impact of managerial ownership on 
debt maturity changes with the discrepancy between control and cash-flow rights of 
large shareholders by interacting Man_Own with Divergence. The estimated coefficient 
is negative and significant (at 5 % level), suggesting that the negative impact of 
managerial ownership on debt maturity is greater in firms where the divergence between 
control and cash-flow rights is larger. In other words, managers of firms with greater 
discrepancy between control and cash-flow rights of shareholders prefer to have more 
short-term debt. This is possibly due to an increase in the expected costs of managerial 
ownership arising from reduced incentives of large shareholders to control the 
management. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper provides new results with regard to the impact of agency costs on 
corporate debt maturity. In doing so, specific attention is paid to relation between debt 
maturity and managerial ownership and divergence between control and cash-flow 
rights of large shareholders. Our main finding is that managerial ownership plays an 
important role in determining debt maturity. The findings reveal that there is a negative 
relationship between managerial ownership and debt maturity. However, the negative 
impact decreases in widely-held firms. The results also reveal a negative relationship 
between debt maturity and the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights. Furthermore, 
the negative impact of managerial ownership on debt maturity increases when the 
divergence increases. 
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The results of this analysis suggest that the agency conflict between shareholders 
and debtholders, i.e. the underinvestment problem, may not be the only agency factor 
that affects debt maturity decisions. It seems that one needs to consider other potential 
agency problems, namely the one between insiders (managers) and outside investors, in 
analysing corporate debt maturity decisions. 
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Table 1 
Ultimate Controllers of UK Companies  
 
Panel A: Percentage of firms controlled by different owners
a
 
 
Widely- 
held 
Widely-held 
Corporation 
Financial 
Institutions 
Family 
Unlisted 
Company 
State Miscel. 
 
10 % Cutoff 
 
24.36 
 
0.64 
 
20.38 
 
26.67 
 
18.72 
 
0.13 
 
9.10 
No. of Firms 190 5 159 208 146 1 71 
20 % Cutoff 67.44 0.51 6.53 15.64 6.41 0 3.47 
No. of Firms 526 4 51 122 50 0 27 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of ultimate ownership by different groups
b
 
 
Widely 
held 
Widely-held 
Corporation 
Financial 
Institutions 
Family 
Unlisted 
Company 
State Miscel. 
 
Mean 
 
0.72 
 
38.35 
 
20.20 
 
29.52 
 
24.71 
 
13.87 
 
21.31 
Min 0 11.07 10.09 10.13 10.25 13.87 10.30 
25 % 0 20.60 11.40 15.65 15.74 13.87 14.08 
Median 0 29.79 16.18 24.46 15.74 13.87 15.1 
75 % 0 65.01 23.10 40.09 26.01 13.87 33.28 
Max 9.48 65.30 89.90 84.50 86.88 13.87 58.90 
This table presents summary statistics on ultimate controllers for a sample of 780 UK firms in 1997. 
a: based on the ownership of the largest control holder. 
b: at the 10 percent ultimate control threshold. 
Source: Our own calculations based on the ultimate ownership data in Faccio and Lang (2002).  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Min 25 % Median 75% Max 
 
Maturity 
 
0.518 
 
0 
 
0.217 
 
0.555 
 
0.812 
 
1 
Leverage 0.161 0 0.077 0.154 0.222 0.842 
Market-to-Book 1.845 0.351 1.047 1.411 1.970 25.161 
Size 9.431 2.338 8.178 9.292 10.543 15.633 
Asset Maturity 11.893 0.948 5.901 8.253 11.750 131.62 
Variability 0.075 0.005 0.039 0.061 0.093 0.814 
Liquidity 1.633 0.224 1.097 1.366 1.772 28.23 
Man_Own 0.119 0 0.004 0.037 0.173 0.844 
Divergence 1.717 0 1 1 1.019 10.26 
 
Maturity is defined as the ratio of debt that matures in more than one year to total debt. Leverage is 
the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Market-to-Book is the ratio of book 
value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of 
total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 1996 prices. Asset Maturity is the ratio of 
net property, plant and equipment to annual depreciation expense. Variability is the standard 
deviation of earnings before interest, tax and depreciation (EBITD) divided by average total assets. 
Liquidity is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. Man_Own is the total percentage of equity 
ownership by directors. Divergence is the ratio of control rights to cash flow rights. 
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Table 3 
Corporate ownership and corporate debt maturity mix 
 
Dependent variable: Maturity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Leverage 0.6085
***
 0.6118
***
 0.6136
***
 0.6126
***
 
(0.1203) (0.1203) (0.1204) (0.1203) 
Market-to-Book      0.0198
***
 0.0201
***
 0.0199
***
 0.0199
***
 
(0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) 
Size 0.0347
***
 0.0358
***
 0.0356
***
 0.0359
***
 
(0.0065) (0.0067) (0.0067) (0.0067) 
Asset Maturity 0.0033
**
 0.0033
***
 0.0033
***
 0.0033
***
 
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
Earnings Variability -0.0030 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0030 
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) 
Liquidity 0.0251
*
 0.0262
*
 0.0262
*
 0.0262
*
 
(0.0140) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0141) 
Man_Own -0.1624
**
 -0.2272
***
 -0.2272
***
 -0.2323
***
 
(0.0736) (0.0852) (0.0853) (0.0850) 
Widely_Held - -0.0012 0.0004 -0.0324 
 (0.0305) (0.0305) (0.0351) 
Man_Own* Widely_Held - 0.2963
*
 0.2910
*
 0.2984
*
 
 (0.1577) (0.1576) (0.1575) 
Divergence - - -0.0011
***
 -0.0010
***
 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Man_Own*Divergence  - - - -0.0256
**
 
   (0.0113) 
     
Constant -0.0094 -0.0300 -0.0274 0.0031 
 (0.0791) (0.0796) (0.0796) (0.0809) 
     
No. of observations 771 771 771 771 
Adjusted  R
2
 0.1590 0.1630 0.1642 0.1649 
 
Maturity is defined as the ratio of debt that matures in more than one year to total debt. 
Leverage is the ratio of book value of total debt to book value of total assets. Market-to-
Book is the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity to book value of total assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total 
assets in 1996 prices. Asset Maturity is the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to 
annual depreciation expense. Earnings Variability is the standard deviation of EBITD 
divided by average total assets. Liquidity is the ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities. Man_Own is the total percentage of equity ownership by directors. 
Widely_Held takes the value of 1 if the firm has no controller. Divergence is the ratio of 
control rights to cash flow rights. Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are in the 
parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) show that the estimated coefficients are significant at 
10%, 5% and 1 % level. 
 
